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2Environmental Leadership?
Comparing regulatory outcomes and industrial performance in the US and the EU
Abstract
There is a widely held view that in the period since the early 1990s the European Union (EU)
has overtaken the United States (US) as the leader with the most advanced or demanding
environmental regulations. However, it is striking that there are very few robust
comparative evaluations of the outcomes of environmental regulations or of levels of
industrial environmental performance in the EU and the US. This paper seeks to address this
by comparing the standards and levels of performance achieved based on a case study of
the regulation of a classic air pollutant (benzene) from a widespread industrial sector that
has been heavily regulated in both settings for many years (oil refineries). Contrary to
expectations, we find that on average normalised levels of emissions from EU refineries are
three times higher than those from US refineries, and whilst outcomes in the US show
marked convergence towards the best standards, there continue to be wide variations in
the outcomes achieved in different EU Member States, despite the rhetoric of
harmonisation.
Keywords: Environmental leadership; environmental regulation; environmental
performance; PRTRs; oil refineries.
31. Introduction
The United States and the European Union represent two of the most industrialised and
economically developed political entities capable of providing global environmental
leadership. In the field of environmental policy, the two actors have taken turns in doing so
ever since environmental issues first emerged on domestic and international agendas in the
late 1960s. The US made enormous strides in this arena during the early days of global
environmentalism in the 1970s, whilst the EU has made significant progress in the
development of environmental policy since the 1990s.
Internationally, the US championed an array of global treaties and agreements in the 1970s
and 80s, such as the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances (Kelemen, 2010). However,
the political dynamics of international environmental policy shifted dramatically during the
period that led to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. US reticence encouraged the
EU to assume a leadership role in multilateral environmental politics and ever since it has
been widely celebrated as the actor carrying the sustainable development flag on the
international scene (Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004: 337). Indicatively, it took the lead in
pushing for the adoption of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). In the course of the past two
decades, the EU has ratified every single major international environmental agreement, in
marked contrast to the US that has overwhelmingly refrained from entering into new
international environmental regimes (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010). Indeed, as Vogler and
Stephan (2007: 394) note, the EU has developed competencies across a range of
environmental policy areas and is signatory to more than 60 multilateral environmental
agreements.
Apart from being at odds over an array of high-profile global environmental issues, the two
actors have also followed divergent paths over time with regards to the field of domestic
environmental law and regulation. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US enacted a flurry of
regulatory statutes aimed at addressing problems of water, soil and air pollution, widely
considered as the most innovative, comprehensive and stringent worldwide (Kelemen and
Vogel, 2010). Starting however with the administration of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993),
US leadership has gradually faded and the country is nowadays widely castigated for lacking
an ambitious environmental policy orientation. For instance, the Clinton administration was
only able to enact a handful of federal regulatory laws, due primarily to opposition from a
Republican-held Congress that was increasingly hostile toward environmental regulations
(Vogel, 2003; Kelemen and Vogel, 2010). The Presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009)
saw no new regulatory initiatives, while a number of its administrative rulings actually
weakened existing standards or their enforcement provisions (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010).
4In addition to the transformation of the EU into a leader in international environmental
politics, the 1990s also saw Europe steadily assuming the place of the US as a domestic
regulatory hegemon (Bach and Newman, 2007: 828). EU environmental policy gained
momentum following the creation of the Single Market and the formal recognition of
environmental protection as part of the legal competence of the EU by the Single European
Act of 1987 (Hildebrand, 1992). Domestic environmental policy has since evolved into one of
the most rapidly expanding areas of EU activity, effectively shaping the nature of global
market rules (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010). The European legislative corpus is currently
considered amongst the most advanced and progressive worldwide in a range of areas, from
greenhouse gas emissions trading to recycling, biosafety and eco-labelling (Falkner, 2007).
Attempts by scholars to account for this shift in US and EU positions rest primarily on
linkages between international and domestic environmental agendas. To offer a few
examples, Sbragia and Damro (1999) argue that while the US Congress has been facing
difficulty in accepting the economic implications of the aforementioned linkages, many EU
Member States have instead grown increasingly willing to further consolidate the European
experiment through supporting, for example, the gradual expansion of the environmental
competences of the European Commission. In addition, differences in the process of
institution building are also pertinent in explaining the aforementioned shift. Whereas the
US Congress as an institution is not engaged in the actual conduct of international
environmental negotiations, the close involvement of all EU actors (Member States,
European Commission and Parliament) in the drawing up of international treaties and EU
environmental Directives markedly enhances their acceptability, prospects for ratification
and likelihood of implementation (Sbragia and Damro, 1999).
Kelemen and Vogel (2010: 427) argue that economic interests provide the most powerful
explanation of why the two actors have traded places with respect to exerting
environmental leadership. In their view, within the EU domestic electoral pressure from
environmentalists since the 1990s has led several (mainly Northern) Member States and
therefore the EU itself to adopt stringent environmental policies and standards on a
plethora of issues. Subsequently, given the implications for European industries, it was in
the competitive trade interests of the EU to champion international agreements that would
result in other jurisdictions adopting environmental regulations of a comparative nature. As
Carpenter (2012: 253) notes, the rationale behind the EU Member States acting as a group
rather than as sovereign states is both to enhance the EUs problematic policy delivery
capabilities, as well as to expand its sustainability visions and values and extend the remit
of its regulations beyond its own borders. While the exact same process took place in the
US during its most active period of environmental legislation in the 70s and 80s, the
subsequent weakening of the political influence of environmental lobbies and the sharp
decline in the adoption rate of domestic regulations resulted in several US administrations
5viewing the spread of environmental regulations championed by the EU as incompatible
with US national competitive interests (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010).
From the above discussion it is apparent that the EU has made significant efforts to position
itself as a leader in environmental policy and to communicate its eagerness to promote the
concept of sustainable development on the global scene (Vogler, 2003). Conventional
contemporary wisdom sees the EU as a proactive environmental regulator, while the US is
usually painted in negative colours, readily given the role of the laggard. Yet, a degree of
cautiousness and scepticism is required when interpreting such rhetoric. While the EU has
been acknowledged as a leader in certain fields (e.g. biosafety or climate), in others (e.g.
agriculture or fisheries) its policies have been associated with particular policy incoherence
(Falkner, 2007; Leventon and Antypas, 2012). In addition, as Skodvin and Andresen (2006)
rightly point out, what may be praised as a progressive stance during the course of
international negotiations might, with the benefit of hindsight, turn out to be quite the
opposite. During for instance the early phases of climate talks, the EU advanced to a leading
position as a vehement critic of the US-advocated market-based approach to emissions
reductions (see Afionis, 2011). Paradoxically, the EU is nowadays attempting to pioneer
their development through its domestic emissions trading scheme (Skodvin and Andresen,
2006; Rayner and Jordan, 2013).
In terms of domestic regulatory politics, Vogel (2003) notes that even though the adoption
rate of important federal environmental laws has substantially decreased, the US has not
ceased regulating. The comprehensive statutes of the past are still in effect and a number of
significant regulations continue to be issued pursuant to them (Vogel, 2003). Other authors
(Weiner, 2004; Weiner and Rogers, 2002) argue that while there are areas in which the EU
has adopted a more precautionary stance (e.g. air toxic substances or genetically modified
organisms), there are other areas in which the US has actually outpaced the EU (e.g.
particulate air pollution, nuclear energy or ozone-depleting substances). In comparative
studies of EU and US policies with regards to automotive emissions, packaging waste and
climate change, Vogel (2012) and Vogel et al. (2012) note that while US regulations in the
latter two fields are substantially weaker than EU ones, when it comes to automotive
emissions standards, the American ones remain stricter.
While there is a significant corpus of work on the stringency and impact of environmental
regulations, as well as on the variability of industrial environmental performance, there is a
surprising lack of comparative studies looking at actual public wellbeing and environmental
outcomes across different countries and over time. One reason for this lacuna is the
absence of data that could facilitate the making of such like for like comparisons. As
Gouldson et al. (2014) note, data sets differ from one country to another and over time and
it is quite difficult and time-consuming to generate normalized measures of performance
that would enable robust comparisons to be made.
6However, undertaking such evaluations of outcomes and performance is critically
important. While the expectation might be that regulatory standards would have a direct
impact on industrial performance, it is often the case that governments promulgate strict
regulatory standards on paper and then are unable to enforce them in practice (see
Gouldson and Murphy, 1997; Jordan, 1999). For standards to have a positive impact they
need to be implemented, enforced and complied with. While there can be economic
reasons for some companies to go beyond compliance, we can expect properly
implemented and enforced regulatory standards to set a minimum level for industrial
environmental performance. Surprisingly, while such levels of performance reflect
important regulatory realities, they are rarely evaluated through international comparative
research (Gouldson and Murphy, 1997).
The purpose of this paper is to add to these debates by examining trends in a particular area
of industrial environmental regulation and performance, namely emissions of benzene from
oil refineries. Classified as a human carcinogen (Bulka et al., 2013), benzene is among the
most widely monitored and intensely regulated air toxics in the world. By focusing on this
pollutant and sector, we enable the generation of the large-scale data set needed to
conduct a comparative analysis of international trends over time. Whilst of course we are
aware that we cannot necessarily draw wider conclusions from a focused analysis, we argue
that the results offer some rare insights that are of great relevance in widespread and
politically charged debates that are often characterized by a lack of evidence. The paper is
structured in the following way. In the next section, we consider the relevant regulations
that are in place in the US and the EU. We then outline the methodology employed for data
collection and analysis, before presenting our findings on regulations and industrial
performance and discussing their significance. The paper concludes by suggesting that this
case offers evidence that contradicts much of the rhetoric on environmental leadership in
the EU and the US.
2. Regulating refinery benzene emissions
This study focuses on emissions of benzene from oil refineries. Benzene is a greenhouse gas
and a toxic pollutant with significant impacts on public health and the environment (EEA,
2012). Health effects from exposure to benzene include increased risk of developing cancer,
various forms of damage to the immune system, as well as an array of neurological,
reproductive, developmental, respiratory and other health complications (EPA, 2012a).
Feitshans (1989) notes that the risks of acute or chronic exposure to benzene were
identified as long ago as 1900. Its occupational use is highly regulated, with the US
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) limiting workplace exposure to
benzene in the air to 1 part per million (ppm) during the average 8 hour work day or 15 ppm
in a 15 minute period (OSHA, undated; see also Capleton and Levy, 2005). Several studies
7have reported that even though average benzene emissions have declined markedly during
the past decade, there are segments of the population in both Europe and the US that are
still exposed to relatively high concentrations (see Cocheo et al., 2000; Ballesta et al., 2006;
Whitworth et al., 2008; Raun et al., 2009).
While vehicular traffic is the primary anthropogenic source of benzene in the atmosphere
(Fruin et al., 2001), refineries constitute the single largest industrial source of benzene
emissions. However, industrial emissions are also significant, and benzene emissions from
refineries are tightly regulated on both sides of the Atlantic. In the EU, a substantial body of
relevant Community legislation has been adopted. The Air Quality Framework Directive of
1996 tasked the European Commission with developing air quality standards and limits for
an array of pollutants, including benzene (European Commission, 1996b). These were
established through a series of subsequent directives, with the so-called Second Daughter
ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨ ? ? ? ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂŵĂǆŝŵƵŵĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ʅŐ ?ŵ3 (micrograms per cubic
metre) for benzene in air to become mandatory from 2010 (European Commission, 2000b).
The Air Quality Directive of 2008 merges the greatest part of the above corpus of legislation
into a single directive (see European Commission, 2008). While there is no change to
existing air quality objectives, EU Member States are given greater flexibility in the ways in
which they comply with certain standards. With regards to benzene emissions, they are
allowed to postpone implementation of concentration limits until 2015.
In order to address emissions from industrial installations, in 1996 the EU adopted the
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive. According to IPPC provisions, in
order to prevent emissions to air, water and land, Member States must ensure that
operators employ the best available techniques (BAT), meaning those that have been
developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant industrial sector, under
economically and technically viable conditions (European Commission, 1996). In order to
specify what constitute BAT, the European Commission has developed a technical guidance
document for each of the sectors covered by the IPPC Directive, known as BAT reference
documents or BREFs (Lange, 2002). Member State regulatory authorities must take BREFs
into account when determining BAT for particular installations, but are not bound by them
(Lange, 2010). The BREF applying to mineral oil and gas refineries provides guidelines on
BAT for controlling air benzene emissions (see European Commission, 2003). In 2010, the EU
then adopted the Industrial Emissions (IED) Directive, which is a recast of seven existing
pieces of legislation (including the IPPC) and which was to be transposed into national
legislation by Member States by January 2013 (see European Commission, 2010). However
as of January 2014, only a third of the Member States has successfully completed the
transposition process (see European Commission, 2014). One of several significant changes
made by the 2010 IED concerns the requirement made upon permitting authorities to
demonstrate the manner in which they have taken into account the BREFs, thus rendering
them mandatory instead of optional (McLean, 2012).
8Although the US has not developed any federally enforceable ambient air standards for
benzene, it has determined a concentration level of airborne benzene that is associated
with significant health risks, including contracting cancer (Raun et al., 2009). The upper end
is an increase of one cancer case in ten thousand people while the lower end is one cancer
case in one million people. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments also listed benzene as one
of 188 Hazardous Air Pollutants and instructed the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to develop emissions standards applicable to a range of industrial sources. In 1995,
the EPA promulgated the National Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for
petroleum refineries (see EPA, 2000), which require operators to meet emission standards
based on the application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT). With regards
to benzene, the EPA has investigated several release incidents over the years, with a high-
profile case involving a $50 million fine against a BP refinery in Texas for safety violations
that included failure to ensure that flares operated at 98 percent efficiency (MACT
standard), thus resulting in a significant release of benzene emissions into the atmosphere
(Rice, 2012).
Another form of regulation in both the US and EU regards the provision of environmental
information through what have become known as Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers
(PRTRs). Their goal is to contribute towards greater transparency and accountability on the
part of regulatory agencies and businesses through the public dissemination of pollution
information (Koehler and Spengler, 2007). This study relied on these publicly available
databases in order to estimate refinery benzene emissions in the US and EU. The next
section introduces their PRTR systems, details the methodology employed and finally
summarizes the range of problems encountered when making use of these informational
regulatory instruments.
3. Data sources and methodology
For this study, data on benzene emissions to air from oil refineries in both the US and EU
were obtained by making use of publicly available information from PRTRs. These were the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) for the period 1990
to 2010, the European Pollution Emission Register (EPER) for the years 2001 and 2004 and
the European Pollution Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) for the period 2007 to 2010.
Data covering periods up to 20 years was collected for the US and the EU. This is a rather
time-intensive task and involves searching through a number of databases to find
information on individual refinery emissions, as well as obtaining access to industry
information on refining capacities. Emissions data are available online, through a process of
selecting year, state, individual refinery, and substance. Multiple searches are necessary to
develop the complete dataset, the analysis of which forms the basis of this paper.
9The US EPAs TRI was introduced in 1986 as a result of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPA, 2012b). The TRI provides a searchable database
offering information on annual releases of over 650 toxic chemicals from a range of
industrial sectors. For the purposes of this study we conducted a search by facility, selecting
geographic location (state), industry (petroleum) and chemical (benzene). Information on
benzene emissions is available for the period 1988 to 2010, in contrast to several other
chemicals where it is available only for a much shorter period of time.
The EU EPER was established in 2000 to make emissions data collected through the 1996
IPPC Directive available to the public (see European Commission, 2000a). The EPER
published data for the EU-15 (i.e. states which were members in 2001 when EPER came into
existence1) for 2001 and 2004 before it was replaced by the more comprehensive E-PRTR.
As it was published every three years, data published in 2001 and 2004 related to emissions
reported in the preceding two years. The E-PRTR covers 65 economic activities within 9
industrial sectors, and provides data for 91 pollutants under 7 groupings. Although the E-
PRTR publishes data for 27 EU Member States, together with Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway,
Serbia and Switzerland, to allow us to include EPER data we have only examined refineries in
the EU-15. Data on benzene emissions from all facilities emitting more than 1,000kg per
year are provided by the EPER and E-PRTR datasets.
The data provided through the US TRI and EU EPER/E-PRTR are typically reported to
state/national regulatory agencies by regulated industrial sites. The normal assumption is
that the data are collected through a monitoring process that has been approved by
regulatory agencies and that companies would face legal sanctions if they were found to
have misreported data. However, clearly there is potential for some regulatory agencies to
be more demanding or rigorous in their approach to reporting and to the enforcement of
associated standards than others (see e.g. Konisky 2009). It is also important to note that
PRTR data can be incomplete  the US and EU PRTR schemes started at different times,
include different sectors and for a period the EU EPER scheme did not report every year. In
each case, PRTR data are also presented as yearly aggregated emissions, making it
impossible to link the data to maximum permissible limits and ambient air quality standards
with shorter time periods. There have also been controversies in some settings about the
reporting of emissions during accidents or phases of maintenance (Ozymy and Jarell, 2011).
Whist not perfect, it has been argued that PRTRs provide the best available data and that for
some relatively homogenous sectors and emissions streams they enable some robust
comparisons of performance to be made both over time and between countries (see
Gouldson and Sullivan, 2007).
1
EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
10
In order to develop a normalised indicator of emissions performance, we divide the total
annual benzene emissions to air (in kg) from each refinery by its production capacity (in bcd,
i.e. barrels per calendar day). Whilst it would have been better to normalise emissions
according to production rather than capacity, refinery specific production figures are not
publically available. By using capacity figures, we make the assumption that all refineries
should have similar levels of downtime over time. Refinery specific capacity data were
obtained from two sources  the Energy Information Administration for US data and the Oil
and Gas Journal for EU data (see EIA and OGJ, various years). The list of refineries included
in these sources differed in some respects from the list of refineries in the relevant PRTRs.
Including only refineries where both emissions and capacity data are available meant that
some refineries listed in only one of the two key data sources were excluded from the
analysis. Nonetheless, our data set covers 91% of US refineries and almost 96% of total US
refining capacity and 51.1% of EU-15 refineries and almost 64.7% of total EU-15 refining
capacity in the year 2010.2 The combined US and EU refineries in this study account for
approximately 25% of global operating refineries and close to 30% of global refining capacity
for 2010 (see Appendices A and B in the supplementary material for further details of
coverage).
4. Results
Figures 1 to 3 present the results of our analysis, with average normalised measures of
emissions per unit of capacity for refineries in the US and the EU (Figure 1) as well as for the
EU-15 and the Member States (Figure 2) and for the US and the US States (Figure 3). These
figures have all been produced using the same scale and for the same time-span to allow for
ease of comparison and to illustrate trends in average normalised emissions over time.
Regarding Figures 1 and 2, it should be noted at this point that for the intervening years
(2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006) no data were available for EU Member States. We have
therefore used dashed lines as a visual aid to help the reader see the data points for the
years that data were available (2001, 2004).
2
The results for the EU-15 include only 65% of refineries as refining capacity data were available for some
countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Greece and Finland, but emissions data had not been submitted to the EU
PRTR.
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Fig. 1  Comparison of Average Normalised Benzene Emissions from US and EU-15 Refineries
Fig. 2  Comparison of Average Normalised Benzene Emissions from EU-15 and Member States
Refineries
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Fig. 3  Comparison of Average Normalised Benzene Emissions from US and State
Refineries
Figure 1 gives a direct comparison between the US and EU-15, showing that for all years
where data are available, the aggregated average normalised emissions are substantially
higher in the EU-15 than in the US. In 2001, the first year in which data became available for
the EU-15, aggregated average normalised emissions were 2.75 times higher in the EU-15
than in the US. For the period 2001 to 2010, aggregated average normalised emissions had
fallen by 26% in the EU-15 and 30% in the US, and were 2.8 times higher in the EU-15 than
the US.
Some of the reasons for these differences become apparent when we look at Figures 2 and
3 and examine the data in more detail. Before moving on, it should be noted that the EU-15
and US lines in these two graphs include all refineries for which both capacity and emissions
data were available. When focusing in on key US states or EU member states, we have
included only those US States or EU-15 Member States for which data were available for 5
or more refineries. This reduces the prospect of presenting results that are overly skewed by
one key refinery, or by countries with a very small number of refineries, and it also means
that we do not over-populate or complicate the graphs. Starting with, Figure 2, we compare
aggregated average normalised emissions performance in EU-15 Member States. To make
this comparison we use a measure of average normalised emissions to benzene to air in
kilograms divided by barrels per calendar day, shown in the figures as average normalised
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emissions (kg/bcd). This reveals major differences in performance between Germany,
France, Italy and particularly the United Kingdom (UK). Emissions performance in Germany
improved significantly from 0.085 kg/bcd in 2001 to 0.019 kg/bcd in 2010, at which point it
was only 36% (just over one third) of the aggregated average performance levels achieved in
the US. Emissions performance in France improved significantly in the period from 2001 to
2010, with average normalised emissions falling by 74% from a relatively high level of 0.282
kg/bcd in 2001 to a level that is 3.9 times higher than Germany and 1.4 times higher than
the US. Average normalised emissions levels from Italy in 2001 were comparable to those of
Germany, and after rising in the period between 2001 and 2007 fell back to levels that were
comparable to those realised in France in 2010. The significant outlier that significantly
affected the average level of performance achieved across the EU-15 was the UK. Here we
see aggregated average normalised emissions levels that increased further from a level that
in 2001 was already 2.17 times the EU-15 level and 5.95 times the US level. In 2010,
aggregated average normalised emissions levels for refineries in the UK were 31 times those
of Germany, 11 times those of the US, nearly 8 times those of France, nearly 7 times those
of Italy and almost 4 times those of the EU-15 as a whole. If the UK figures are excluded
from the EU-15 total, the UK performs over 8 times worse than the remaining EU-15
Member State average.
Turning to the US, Figure 3 shows a marked convergence in the aggregated average
normalised emissions levels achieved in those states with 5 or more refineries in the period
from 1990 to 2010. Of the states with 5 or more refineries, California had the lowest
emissions levels throughout the study period, and in 2010 had aggregated average
normalised emissions that were roughly half of those of Germany in the EU. Emissions levels
in the worst performing US States  particularly Texas with its high number of refineries 
improved significantly in the period from 1990 when the average normalised emissions level
was nearly 11 times that of California, falling to just over 6 times higher by 2010. Although
the worst performing state in 2010 (Utah) had an average normalised emissions level that
was 7.5 times more than California, it was broadly comparable with France and Italy, was
just over half the average level achieved by the EU -15 as a whole and just over one eighth
that of the UK.
5. Discussion
These findings are particularly significant for the regulators and operators of oil refineries,
and for the communities that live near to oil refineries. They highlight the presence of some
significant variations in regulatory outcomes and operator performance. Whilst they do not
consider the broader economic or regulatory context, they do suggest that refineries in
some settings are much more effectively regulated or better managed than in others.
Similarly, whilst they do not assess ambient air quality they do suggest that some
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populations and communities are much more exposed to the risks associated with this
carcinogenic air pollutant than others.
By exploring outcomes, obviously we do not examine causal factors. Despite claims in the
wider literature about the diffusion of regulatory standards, technologies, best practices and
so on (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Jörgens, 2004), it seems likely that significant variations in
these determinants of environmental outcomes remain. Wider governance conditions vary
 outcomes are influenced by a wider range of policies, by variable market conditions and
by differing blends of media, NGO or community pressure (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). More
specifically, regulators have different powers and levels/forms of resources and adopt
different regulatory styles in different countries (see e.g. Jordan et al., 2003). Some
refineries are older than others and they refine different forms of oil, generate different
products and by-products and adopt different management practices and clean or control
technologies (Gary and Handwerk, 2001). It is likely that normalised outcomes would be
affected by complex and contingent blends of these and other location-specific factors. In
the case of the UK, for instance, Gouldson et al. (2014) report that domestic variation in
benzene emissions was due, inter alia, to some older refineries not having been upgraded
for some time or not having invested in augmenting their processes and pollution control
technologies. They also note that UK regulators may have greater discretion when
interpreting and applying regulations, which could allow them to pay greater attention to
economic concerns compared to their counterparts in other EU countries.
Whilst the reasons for the variations in regulatory outcomes or industrial performance need
to be better understood, there is still either a common expectation that they should be
similar in different contexts or an interest in the reasons why they differ. Our analysis clearly
shows that regulators and refinery operators secure better levels of emissions performance
for example in the US and Germany than they do in the UK. If higher regulatory standards
are associated with the imposition of a competitive disadvantages (Rodrik 1997), then
refineries in the UK seem to be deriving a substantial competitive advantage from under-
regulation, at least when compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the EU-15 and the
US.
In its environmental justice strategies, the US EPA has the goal of offering equal protection
to all populations (EPA, 2004). Although we do not explore refinery/location specific levels
of emissions or of ambient air quality, our results do suggest that at the US State/EU
Member State level, the level of protection from benzene emissions offered to different
populations varies significantly. Despite significant convergence in levels of performance
over time across the US, residents of California that live in areas affected by benzene
pollution from refineries are still better protected than their counterparts in the worst-
performing state. But on average exposed communities in the US as a whole are better
protected than those in the EU. Within the EU, residents of Germany that live close to
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refineries receive levels of protection that are comparable to those of their counterparts in
the US, but similar residents in France and Italy are slightly less well protected. Residents in
the UK are substantially less well protected than either the average for the EU-15 or than
those in the US.
More broadly, the analysis indicates that whilst the EU may be the leader when it comes to
its support for international agreements or the adoption of new environmental policy
instruments, when it comes to environmental outcomes in the domestic field the US retains
some ability to surpass the EU. Our findings, therefore, resonate with those of other studies
that caution against generalizing when it comes to comparing transatlantic environmental
policymaking (Vogel et al., 2012; Weiner, 2004; Weiner and Rogers, 2002). Indeed, our
findings contradict the prevailing rhetoric of the EU having taken over from the US as a
domestic regulatory hegemon since the 1990s (Bach and Newman 2007: 828).
Our analysis also emphasises the opportunity to improve regulatory outcomes and industrial
performance and to promote convergence towards the best standards. In the US, the results
suggest that a worst first approach has been adopted by regulators that focuses effort on
the worst performing states, but we do not see so many signs of this in the EU where there
is a distinct lack of convergence or harmonisation of outcomes in the EU. As we see more
limited policy change relating to the case in the US than in the EU, standards do not seem to
be improving through the international diffusion of policies. Similarly, as many refineries are
owned by multi-national companies, it does not seem that there is an even diffusion of
different technologies and management practices. Instead, improved outcomes and
performance seem to be being generated through domestic transfers of best practices in
implementation.
Our findings could also offer some important insights into the effectiveness of different
regulatory styles. There has been some discussion that the US has a peculiarly legalistic and
adversarial regulatory style, approximated in Europe mainly by Germany, and that the UK
has a peculiarly cooperative and flexible regulatory style that is mirrored in many other
contexts in the EU (Lange and Gouldson, 2010). Following Vogel (1986), the presumption
has been that these regulatory styles secure equivalent environmental outcomes. But our
finding that the US and Germany secure substantially better outcomes than other EU
Member States and especially the UK could be an indication that legalistic and more
adversarial regulatory styles are more effective in achieving environmental outcomes than
cooperative and flexible ones.
6. Conclusions
This paper offers some rare insights into a widespread and often politically charged debate
on comparative standards in environmental regulation or industrial environmental
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performance that is often characterised by a lack of evidence. Whilst we cannot make
general claims about the stringency of environmental regulation or levels of industrial
environmental performance in the EU and the US based on this focused analysis, we can say
that many of the broader claims or assumptions that are made about environmental
leadership in the EU and the US are not always true. Instead, the findings of the paper show
that the US can be more of an environmental leader than the EU when it comes to
regulatory outcomes or industrial environmental performance, that industry in the EU is not
always put at a competitive disadvantage by over regulation, that populations in the US may
be better protected than those in the EU, that EU policies are not always leading to
harmonisation and it is still possible for environmental laggards to exist. These are
significant findings. They show that leadership is not only about rhetoric and innovation in
policy design, substantial improvements can be delivered by advances in policy delivery,
that worst first approaches to the implementation of regulation can deliver sustained
improvements in outcomes over time and that adversarial regulatory styles may be more
effective in securing better environmental and public health protection outcomes than
cooperative ones. All of these findings have significant implications for wider debates on
environmental leadership.
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